Should monetary policy "lean or clean"? by William R. White
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute  




Should Monetary Policy “Lean or Clean”?
* 
 





It has been contended by many in the central banking community that monetary policy 
would not be effective in “leaning” against the upswing of a credit cycle (the boom) but that 
lower interest rates would be effective in “cleaning” up (the bust) afterwards. In this paper, 
these two propositions (can’t lean, but can clean) are examined and found seriously deficient. 
In particular, it is contended in this paper that monetary policies designed solely to deal with 
short term problems of insufficient demand could make medium term problems worse by 
encouraging a buildup of debt that cannot be sustained over time. The conclusion reached is 
that monetary policy should be more focused on “preemptive tightening” to moderate credit 
bubbles than on “preemptive easing” to deal with the after effects. There is a need for a new 
macrofinancial stability framework that would use both regulatory and monetary instruments 
to resist credit bubbles and thus promote sustainable economic growth over time.  
 
JEL codes: E5 
 
                                                 
* William R White is currently the chairman of the Economic Development and Review Committee at the 
OECD  in  Paris.  He  was  previously  Economic  Advisor  and  Head  of  the  Monetary  and  Economic 
Department at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. white.william@sunrise.ch. +41 
(0) 79 834 90 66.This paper grew out of a presentation at a Monetary Roundtable at the Bank of England, 
and has benefitted from comments made at conferences at Bank Negara Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur, and at 
the Centre for Financial Studies in Frankfurt, Germany. The views in this paper are entirely personal and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the 









Should Monetary Policy “Lean or Clean”? 
By William R White  
 
A.  Introduction 
Should monetary policy lean against the wind of the expansion phase of credit upturns, in 
order  to  moderate  boom  conditions?  Clearly,  no  one  would  question  the  desirability  of 
leaning  enough  to  reduce  associated  inflationary  pressures.  But  should  the  reaction  be 
stronger than that which near-term inflation control might seem to warrant? In particular, 
should policy be tighter than otherwise, given evidence of growing “imbalances” in the real 
economy
1 or increasing systemic exposures in the financial system? Or should an alternative 
strategy be relied upon to deal with such problems. In particular, should monetary policy be 
content with trying to clean up afterwards, once the boom has turned to bust? Indeed, 
should central banks go even further and preemptively ease policy in order to short circuit 
the bust altogether? 
As a matter of logic, the answer to the lean or clean question must depend on an evaluation 
of the relative merits of each approach, since alternatives cannot be evaluated in isolation. 
The  dominant  view  until  quite  recently  seems  to  have  been  in  favor  of  cleaning  up 
afterwards. However, the practical difficulties encountered in trying to do so over the last 
eighteen months seem now to be altering the balance of earlier arguments. 
Indeed,  the  current  set  of  economic  circumstances  facing  the  official  community  is  as 
difficult as any seen in the postwar period. Growth is slowing, and quite sharply in both the 
advanced  and  emerging  market  economies.  For  a  time  inflationary  pressures  were  also 
rising, particularly in the emerging market economies, though they now seem to be receding 
in the face of an unexpectedly sharp slowing of near- term - growth prospects. In the major 
financial centers, many markets are dysfunctional and some are not operating at all. Many 
financial institutions have had to be closed down, nationalized or supported in some way by 
governments. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the economic and financial situation will 
worsen substantially before it eventually improves. 
The purpose of this paper is to suggest steps that might be taken to help avoid a repeat of 
these  difficulties  in  the  future.  Evidently,  this  presupposes  some  understanding  of  what 
caused today’s difficulties in the first place.  
Liberalized  financial  systems  seem  to  be  inherently  “procyclical”.
2  That  is,  there  are 
endogenous cycles in which some piece of good news leads to both an increased demand for 
and supply of credit. This affects positively both asset prices and spending, contributing to 
still more optimism and providing still more collateral for still more loans. Eventually, all 
these  trends  overshoot  levels  justified  by  the  initial  improvement  in  fundamentals  and 
rational exuberance becomes irrational exuberance.  In the end, the bubble bursts and the 
                                                           
1 Imbalances are defined here as significant and sustained deviations from longer run trends. Such deviations 
raise the possibility of mean reversion, perhaps with associated macroeconomic costs. Evidently, such an 
outcome need not be inevitable, given that underlying fundamentals might have changed enough to justify 
these unusual observations. Nevertheless, mean reversion seems a quite common historical phenomenon. 









process of speculation and leverage which powered it goes into reverse. Such processes 
have been seen repeatedly in history. The great recessions beginning in 1825, 1873 and 1929 
all shared these characteristics
3, as did the more re cent Nordic, Japanese and South East 
Asia crises
4. Moreover, in each instance the crisis emerged suddenly and unexpectedly, and 
without any significant degree of accelerating inflation beforehand.  
There is a great deal of evidence to support the view that we are witnessing something quite 
similar today. The “New Era” and “Great Moderation” proclaimed in the latter part of the 
1990’s led to a variety of excesses which suddenly collapsed around the turn of the century. 
This was met in turn by an unprecedented degree of monetary easing in the large industrial 
countries,  and  subsequently  by  very  easy  monetary  policies  in  many  emerging  market 
countries (accompanied by massive foreign exchange intervention) as they tried to resist 
upward pressure on their exchange rates.  The upshot was that global interest rates, both 
short and long, were held at unusually low levels for much of this decade. These lower rates 
contributed (a demand side effect) to a massive increase in monetary and credit aggregates. 
A  further  contribution  to  this  credit  growth  (a  supply  side  effect)  was  made  by  sharply 
declining lending standards. These easier lending terms were said at the time to be justified, 
both by an overall reduction in the risks to be managed, and by improved risk management 
capacities. In both the advanced and emerging market countries, many borrowers obtained 
access to credit who would never have been able to do so in the past (subprime mortgages, 
for  example)  or  did  so  on  unusually  easy  terms  (cov-lite  corporate  loans,  for  example).  
Speculation and leverage are also thought to have expanded significantly, not least through 
the use of new structured products with high levels of leverage imbedded in them. 
These developments contributed to record high global growth rates, until quite recently. 
Inflation, moreover, was quiescent for an unexpectedly long period under the influence of a 
variety of positive supply shocks, not least the process of globalization
5. However, at the 
same time, these financial developments were also contributing to the gradual buildup of at 
least four major  “imbalances” affecting both the financial and real sectors of the global 
economy.
6 As to the former, most asset prices (not least housing) rose to unprecedented 
levels. The exposure of financial firms to risks of various sorts, as can now be clearly seen 
with hindsight,  also increased sharply. As to the latter, household saving rates in many 
countries (especially the English speaking ones) fell to zero or even below, while the ratio of 
investment to  GDP in China rose to almost 50 per cent
7. Again, such  National Income 
                                                           
3 On this see Schumpeter (1934) 
4 See Kindleberger and Aliber (2006) 
5 White (2008a) provides a fuller assessment of the relationship between globalization and domestic inflation. 
6 As noted above, imbalances are defined here as significant and sustained deviations from longer run trends. 
Logically, individual deviations might be explained in a variety of idiosyncratic ways. However, when a wide 
variety of imbalances emerge simultaneously, this rather points in the direction of a joint underlying cause. This 
is pursued further below. 
7 From a Wicksellian perspective, troubles arise whenever the financial rate (say, the long bond rate) differs 
from the natural rate (proxied by the prospective growth rate of the economy). Estimates of each for the global 
economy show that the financial rate fell below the natural rate in 1997, as the global growth rate of potential 
accelerated, and the gap continued to increase at least until the middle of 2008.  See Knight (2008). In the 
English speaking countries, where the financial system has focused increasingly on lending to the household 
sector, consumption rose as a result. In China, where consumer credit is much less freely available, it was 
investment (often subject to political influences) that rose to very high levels. The crucial point, however, is 
that both imbalances seem to have a common source; namely, a large and longstanding gap between the 









Account numbers are unprecedented in large countries in the post war world. Finally, a 
number of countries with highly advanced financial systems and associated low household 
saving rates ran very large trade deficits. These were largely financed by capital inflows from 
surplus countries that had accumulated reserves in the process of resisting exchange rate 
appreciation. 
 
Evidently, the period of high global growth and essentially stable prices has now come to an 
end.    Perhaps  the  first  overt  manifestation  of  the  effects  of  the  long  period  of  rapid 
monetary and credit expansion was the sharp rise in commodity prices. With the influence of 
the earlier positive supply shocks having run their course, higher commodity prices quickly 
fed through to headline CPI in many countries. However, lower real wages subsequently 
weighed  on  spending  and  growth,  and  this  deceleration  was  further  aggravated  as  the 
imbalances noted above began to unwind. Indeed, the slowdown has been so sharp, and the 
effects on commodity prices already so appreciable, that the earlier worries about inflation 
have increasingly been replaced by fears of near term deflation. 
 
The tipping point in this transition was arguably the “Minsky moment” in financial markets
8  
which occurred in August of 2007. The announcement that BNP had suspended redemptions 
from three of their investment funds sparked a massive withdrawal of liquidity from the 
market  for  asset  based  securities,  not  least  by  money  market  mutual  funds  fearful  of 
“breaking  the  buck”.  Since  then,  the  process  of  financial  deterioration  has  continued 
relentlessly  with  a  wide  spectrum  of  asset  prices  falling  sharply  and  many  financial 
institutions having merged, gone bankrupt, or now on the verge of bankruptcy.  
Due in part to tighter credit conditions and the wealth destruction arising from lower asset 
prices, real growth in the advanced industrial economies has also slowed sharply. However, 
probably more important has been the beginning of a process of mean reversion in spending 
patterns, in countries exhibiting  such imbalances, and the spread of this effect to other 
countries  through  trade  linkages  in  particular.  The  emerging  market  economies  initially 
seemed somewhat immune to this slowdown, but it is now clear that they too have been 
caught up in this global transition
9.  
This  interactive  process  of deterioration between the real and financial sectors , as the 
various imbalances simultaneously unwind, has yet to fully run its course. Nor have we yet 
seen the full impact on global currency markets, or on protectionist sentiment, of the 
current  large  trade  imbalances.  Recognizing  the  potential  economic  costs  of  all  these 
developments raises the important question of how such processes might be avoided, or at 
least the costs moderated, in the  future?  Given that the underlying problem is one of 
excessive credit creation, there should be a strong presumption that monetary policy will 
                                                           
8 A “Minsky moment” refers to the analysis of financial crises initially put forward by Hyman Minsky. See 
Minsky (1992) for a summary. He refers to various stages in the credit upswing, characterized by an ever 
declining quality of loans, with the end result being a “Ponzi” like financial structure. Interestingly, Irving Fisher 
(1933) painted a similar picture of this process. The “Minsky moment” is that point in time when the market 
suddenly recognizes the scale of the accumulated potential losses and further lending ceases. According to this 
story, markets may look illiquid but the underlying problem is one of fears about solvency. The word “arguably” 
is used in the text, because the panic in August 2007 had been preceded by well over a year of declining US 
house prices and rising default and delinquency rates. The markets, however, initially chose to ignore these 
developments.  









have  a  significant  role  to  play  in  leaning  against  these  excesses.  In  the  same  way  that 
repairing  a  broken  financial  system  may  be  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for 
restoring health to the real economy after a “bust”, relying solely on regulatory mechanisms 
to moderate a “boom” might also prove insufficient.  
B.  The “lean versus clean” debate  
Against this background, an attempt is made in this paper to evaluate what has been a 
dominant  analytical  paradigm  guiding  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  in  recent  years; 
namely, that it is impossible to lean against credit bubbles using tighter monetary policy, but 
that it is possible to clean up afterwards using easier monetary policy.
10 Should it be possible 
to throw doubt on either or both of these propositions, then support is provided for the 
arguments presented in Section  D  of this paper.  It is  suggested  there  that  “preemptive 
tightening” should replace “preemptive easing”. 
While not alone, the Federal Reserve seems most evidently to have conducted its monetary 
policy  in  strict  conformance  with  the  dominant  analytical  paradigm.  Over  the  last  two 
decades, representatives of the Federal Reserve System repeatedly stressed that monetary 
policy had been tightened only in response to the prospective inflationary implications of 
asset price increases, not in response to accumulating credit related imbalances (as such) or 
increasing exposures within the financial system.  Conversely, when financial disturbances 
threatened  growth  prospects,  monetary  policy  was  repeatedly  eased  significantly.  This 
occurred in 1987 (the stock market crash), in 1990-91 (the property crash, and the S and L 
crisis), in 1998 (LTCM), in 2001-4 (the end of the NASDAQ bubble), and most recently in 2007 
in response to the current financial difficulties. In addition, in the context of the Asian crisis 
of 1997, monetary policy was not tightened even though all of the traditional indicators said 
it should have been. This pattern of “preemptive easing” was referred to by (then) Chairman 
Greenspan as a risk management paradigm. In sum, combining a refusal to lean with an 
eagerness to clean implies that the Fed’s policy has been highly asymmetrical over the credit 
cycle.  
Whether this approach is appropriate is already being implicitly questioned by some other 
central banks. The Bank of Japan, for example, has announced that its policy settings will be 
determined  by  two  “perspectives”.  While  the  first  perspective  is  very  similar  to  the 
“gapology”  methodology
11  favored  by  the  Fed,  the  second  perspective  seems  to  be  a 
promise to resist in the future the formation of the credit and associated debt excesses that 
plagued Japan in the 1980’s. Given how long Japan was stuck in the “bust” period, with all its 
accumulated economic costs, that promise is not surprising. Similarly, the European Central 
Bank has a second “pillar” in addition to a conventional first one.  While historically rooted in 
the belief that there is a low frequency association between money growth and inflation, 
some people associated with  the European System of Central Banks now seem more willing 
to suggest that the second pillar could also foretell other kinds of problems
12. While this 
                                                           
10 See, for example, Bernanke (2002), Mishkin (2007) and Kohn (2008).For a more recent description (and also a  
qualified recantation), see Yellen (2009) 
11 The gap referred to here is not the Wicksellian gap referred to in fn.7.  Rather, it is the gap between 
estimates of actual output and potential output, or the equivelant in terms of labour market variables. It is this 
gap that is commonly thought to drive changes in the rate of inflation. 









evolution is by no means complete, it seems clear that the grounds for a serious analytical 
debate have at least been laid.
13 
Nor is this a new issue.  Ind eed, it  was at the heart of the famous debate between Hayek 
and Keynes in the early 1930’s.
14 Keynes won this debate, in part because Hayek offered no 
hope that policy might be used to ameliorate the situation during the Great Depression. In 
the process, Hayek’s message was lost that the magnitude of the problem in the downswing 
was due to the buildup of imbalances (specifically “malinvestments”) in the upswing of the 
credit cycle. This is one aspect of the debate that needs to be reopened. At the same time, 
the scope for policies to resist the downturn also need to be reexamined in light of another  
Austrian insight. It is not self evident that policies are desirable when they are effective only 
at  the  expense  of  creating  even  bigger  problems  in  the  future
15.  Whenever there is an 
intertemporal tradeoff,  at least  some attention needs to be paid to the discounted net 
benefit offered by alternative policies. 
The possibility that policies which are effective in the short run might have longer term costs 
is also suggested by some of the insights from dynamic control theory, applied to economics 
in the 1950’s by the engineer A  W Philips
16. Think of the economy as a system subject to 
shocks, and one in which the policy instrument  has significant lagged effects on the  real 
economy  (say  through  encouraging  procyclicality) .    In  such  a  world,  a  problem  of 
“instrument instability” can easily arise. In this situation, a successful effort to ensure that 
the actual level of output closely matches that desired by the policymaker comes at the cost 
of  the  stabilizing  instrument  having  to  move  ever  more  sharply  in  successive  cycles. 
Evidently,  such  policies  cannot  be  sustained  forever
17.  The solution to this  instrument 
instability problem was often found by engineers to be a lightening of the control procedure, 
to allow deviations from equilibrium to be somewhat longer lasting. By analogy, this implies 
that policies of “preemptive easing” might in the end prove disruptive. Put otherwise, small 
recessions  (temporary  deviations  from  equilibrium)  might  sometimes  serve  to  ward  off 
bigger deviations later. Moreover, in the case of monetary policies, the dangers might be 
even greater than the analogy suggests. This is because the monetary control instrument 
(policy rates) must eventually be constrained by the zero lower bound, and that asymmetric 
policies over successive cycles would make this a more and more likely outcome.  
 
                                                           
13 For a discussion of some other significant differences between major central banks in how they conduct 
monetary policy, and why, see White (2008b). 
14 Hicks (1967) noted how this debate “captured the imagination” of economists at the time, but had been 
almost forgotten by the late 1960’s. For a fuller account see Cochran and Glahe (1999)    
15 Contrast Keynes‘ famous comment:“In the long run we are all dead“, with von Mises: “No very deep 
knowledge of economics is usually needed to grasp the immediate effects of a measure; but the task of 
economics is to foretell the remoter effects, and so to allow us to avoid such acts as attempt to remedy a 
present ill by sowing the seeds of a much greater ill for the future” One is also reminded of Milton Friedman 
who, on being told that money growth only led to inflation in the long run, was said to have  responded “I have 
seen the long run, and it is now”. 
16 Philips (1957 )  
17 In making a similar point, Cooper (2008, p137) makes delightful reference to early work on “governors” for 
steam-driven saws. If “over governed”, such that the steam pressure was quickly altered to keep the saw 
moving exactly at a predefined pace, after the wood was put on the blade, the machine would literally shake 









Arguments  supporting  (and  opposing)  the  view  that  monetary  policy  cannot  be  used 
effectively to lean against the expansionary phase of the credit cycle 
 It  is  important  to  note  that  the  arguments  supporting  this  view  have  focused  almost 
exclusively on the difficulties of using monetary policy to lean against asset price increases, 
rather than the underlying credit cycle itself
18.  Rising asset prices are, of course, only one 
imbalance of many that can be generated by easy credit conditions.  However, this narrow 
focus does have the advantage of allowing a number of plausible  arguments to be made 
against the straw man of “targeting” asset prices.   
The  first  argument  is  that  there  is  a  number  of  asset  prices  that  might  be  targeted.  
Advocates of a policy of leaning against the wind are then invited to choose which asset 
price should be the focus of the authorities’ attentions, and to explain why.  Since there is no 
obvious right answer to such a question, the whole approach of leaning against the wind is 
made  to  seem  questionable.  A  second  criticism  is  that,  absent  any  clear  criteria  for 
determining the level of the asset price consistent with “fundamental value”, it is impossible 
to estimate deviations from such a price in order to lean against it. A third criticism is that, 
given expectations of further increases in any rising asset price, the interest rate increases 
required to “prick the bubble” would be so great as to cause material damage to other parts 
of the economy.
19  
A more general argument against leaning against the credit cycle is that it might result in an 
undershoot of the desired level of inflation, whether tha t level is expressed as an explicit  
target or not.   Two sorts of concerns can be noted   in this regard. The first is that the 
economy might inadvertently be pushed into deflation, with all of the problems  said to be  
associated with such a development. The   second is that, by undershooting  the  desired 
inflation levels, the credibility of  the central bankers´ fundamental commitment to price 
stability as a longer term goal might be brought into question.  If he/she can countenance 
undershoots, why not overshoots as well?
20  
Those opposing the dominant view (thus favoring the use of monetary policy to lean against 
the expansionary phase of the cycle) begin with a simple point. To favor leaning against the 
credit cycle
21 is not at all the same thing as advocating “targeting” asset prices. Rather, they 
wish to take action to restrain the whole nexus of imbalances arising from excessively easy 
credit conditions. The focus should be on the underlying cause rather than one symptom of 
accumulating problems. Thus, confronted with a combination of rapid increases in monetary 
and credit aggregates, increases in a wide range of asset prices, and deviations in spending 
                                                           
18 Weber (op. cit, p5) is implicitly critical in this regard. He states “The debate about monetary policy and 
financial markets is too often slanted to the question of how to deal with asset price bubbles. In my opinion, 
this view of monetary policy and asset prices is too narrow”. He then goes on to suggest that the focus should 
be “redirected from financial bubbles to the issue of “procyclicality”, which is consistent with what is being 
suggested in this paper. See also Borio (2003) and White (2005). 
19 For a recent airing of such arguments see Greenspan (2009) 
20 A number of practical difficulties would also have to be faced, should a central bank wish to lean against the 
wind of the credit cycle. These issues are addressed in the last section of this paper, supposing that the case for 
leaning, in principle, has been accepted. 
21  A policy of leaning against the wind of procyclicality has been recommended in successive Annual Reports of 
the BIS and in many publications by BIS Staff. In particular, see the various papers on the BIS website by Borio, 









patterns from traditional norms, the suggestion is that policy would tend to be tighter than 
otherwise.  
From this broader perspective, there is no need to choose which asset price to target. It is a 
combination of developments that should evoke concern. Nor is there a need to calculate 
with accuracy the fundamental value of individual assets. Rather, it suffices to be able to say 
that some developments seem significantly out of line with what the fundamentals might 
seem to suggest. Finally, there is no need to “prick” the bubble and to do harm to the 
economy in the process. Rather, the intention is simply to tighten policy in a way to restrain 
the credit cycle on the upside, with a view to mitigating the magnitude of the subsequent 
downturn. Note as well, that general inflation would normally also be tending upwards in 
such circumstances, so that what is at issue here is not likely to be the direction of policy, but 
rather only the degree of policy tightening.  
As for the more general concerns about undershooting the inflation target, this could lead to 
outright deflation, but it need not. In any event, it needs to be stressed that the experience 
of deflation is not always and everywhere a dangerous development.
22 The experience of 
the United States in the 1930’s was certainly horrible, but almost as surely unique
23. There 
have been many other historical episodes of de flation, often associated with bursts of 
productivity increases, in which falling prices were in fact associated with continuing real 
growth and increases in living standards.  As noted above,  there can be little doubt that 
serious problems can arise from the interaction of falling prices and wages and high levels of 
nominal debt. But the essential point of leaning against the upswing of the credit cycle is to 
mitigate the buildup of such debt in order to moderate the severity of the subsequent 
downturn. The price undershoot, per se, would not seem to be a problem if the economy is 
still growing strongly under the influence of the credit cycle itself.  As for an undershoot 
undermining the credibility of the price stability objective, this would seem far less l ikely 
than the effects of an overshoot and should be easily explainable to the general public.  
There are also other arguments supporting the views of those wishing to lean against the 
upswing of the credit cycle. It is very possible that credible statements of official concern and 
determination to act would change private behavior in a more stabilizing direction.  In 
particular, it might help moderate some of the excesses seen in banking and credit markets, 
with their subsequent effects on asset prices and  spending propensities.  This is not an 
outlandish suggestion
24. Indeed, it is now widely believed  that a similar change occurred in 
the way inflationary expectations were formed after central banks became more serious 
about controlling inflation. Finally, tightening policy more in the upswing would seem likely 
to mitigate the size of the downswing,
25 and would also provide more room for policy easing 
                                                           
22 See Borio and Filardo (2005). 
23 Atkeson and Kehoe (2004) note in their concluding remarks, based on a broad historical study of 17 countries 
over 100 years, that “The data suggest that deflation is not closely related to depression” . Elsewhere they 
state “Our main finding is that the only episode in which there is evidence of a link between deflation and 
depression is the Great Depression (1929-1934)”.  
24 Greenspan (2009) states “I know of no instance where incremental monetary policy has defused a bubble”. 
This may or may not be true, but the historical record might well have been different had there been a 
different countercyclical policy regime in place before the expansionary phase of the credit bubble began. 
25 One reason for believing in such a relationship is  that financial institutions might become less exposed to 
bad loans during the upturn. This, together with other policies designed to make them more resilient to 









in response. In particular, with interest rates higher at the peak of the cycle, there would less 
chance of running into the serious constraint of the zero lower bound for interest rates. 
 
Arguments supporting (and opposing) the view that it is effective to use monetary policy 
to clean up in the contractionary phase of the credit cycle. 
The first argument used by those supporting this view (that monetary easing will effectively 
stimulate aggregate demand) is that it seems generally supported by the macroeconomic 
models now commonly used by central banks. These include large scale structural models,  
not much changed since the 1970’s, but increasingly the use of Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium  Models  (DSGE)
26  as  well.  The  second  argument  is  that  policy  easing  has 
consistently worked to stimulate  demand in the past. As noted above, the Fed’s  typical 
response to financial turmoil since 1987 has been to ease monetary policy and, in every 
instance to date, the economy subsequently resumed growth.  Indeed, over the last few 
decades, recessions have been very mild and the variance of output growth has been very 
low
27. Third, as for previous experiences of costly deflations, the United States in the 1930’s 
and Japan in the 1990’s, it is argued that these were primarily the byproduct of policy error. 
In particular, the authorities failed to ease monetary policy aggressively enough
28.  
A fourth argument, of increasing practical relevance as policy rates edge ever lower, is that 
monetary policy can still be effective even at (or very near) the  zero lower bound for the 
policy  rate.  The  argument  rests  upon  the  efficacy  of  three  propositions
29.  First,  it  is 
suggested that long rates can be lowered by generating expectations that the policy rate will 
be kept very low for an extended period. Second, it is held that  term and credit risk premia 
can be reduced through changes in the rel ative supply of securities, reflecting shifts in the 
composition of the central bank’s balance sheet. Third, it is suggested that “quantitative 
easing”, in which the central bank’s balance sheet is allowed to expand beyond the size 
required  to  keep  the  policy  rate  at  zero,  can  have  expansionary  effects  though  various 
channels.   
Those opposed to this view, rely in part on refuting the arguments above. The first argument 
rests  on  the  reliability  of  models  of  the  macroeconomy.  Evidently,  models  must  not  be 
confused with reality and, in fact, large structural models have had a very poor record in 
predicting the turning points of even standard cycles in the post war period. To this must be 
added the reality of massive change in the real economy, the financial sector and the policy 
regime  in  recent  years.  The  assumption  of  parametric  stability  under  such  conditions  is 
highly implausible, unless the parameters are so loosely estimated in the first place as to 
raise serious doubts about the model’s reliability. Further, even the large structural models 
have very rudimentary financial sectors, and their predictions might therefore be particularly 
suspect at times of financial crisis. As for more modern DSGE models, even their supporters 
                                                           
26 For an overview see Tovar (2008) 
27 The low variance of output growth in the United States, together with inflation remaining both low and 
stable, led to the accolade “The Great Moderation” referred to above. 
28 See Ahearne et al (2002)  










admit that they are “work in progress”, and they possess even more rudimentary financial 
sectors than those seen in more structural models. 
30 
As for the second argument,  just  because something has worked in the past need not 
logically imply that it  is certain to  work in the future.
31 Indeed, the degree of monetary 
easing required to kick start the United States economy seems to have been rising through 
successive downturns as the “headwinds” of debt have become stronger
32.The recognition 
that something seems to have changed in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
likely accounts for the spate of recent conferences on this particular topic.
33  After the crisis 
emerged in the summer of 2007, it was disquieting that, as the US policy rate fell at a record 
pace, mortgage rates actually rose for an extended period. A similar phenomenon was seen 
early in the last cycle of easing . Then, lower short rates initially failed to feed through to 
standard channels of the transmission mechanism until asset prices started to rise strongly 
in the middle of 2003.
34 In the United States, in spite of unprecedented monetary and fiscal 
stimulus, the recovery after 2002 was the weakest in post war history.  
One way to explain  this phenomenon  might    be in terms of the cumulative effects of 
previous  policy  act ions.    As  noted  above,  the  Fed  has  used  “preemptive  easing”  on 
successive occasions since the stock market crash of 1987, and many other central banks 
more or less followed its leadership. In each case, it could be argued that the resulting 
demand  stimulus  came  in  the  form  of  an  unsustainable  bubble,  which  was  then 
subsequently replaced by yet another bubble. The series begins with the easing of monetary 
policy  in  the  late  1980’s  which  helped  spur  the  subsequent  property  bubble  in  many 
countries. The subsequent period of very low rates in the early 1990’s, led to the decline in 
the value of the US dollar (and the Asian currencies effectively linked to it) and contributed 
to the Asian bubble. The subsequent decision not to raise rates, in spite of tighter domestic 
conditions, contributed to the excesses of the LTCM period, and the subsequent easing of 
rates then induced the stock market speculation of the late 1990’s. When this collapsed and 
rates were sharply reduced in  response, the seeds of the housing market boom and bust 
were sown. Moreover, with many countries again resisting currency appreciation as the US 
dollar  fell  through  most  of  this  decade, the  imbalances  referred  to  above  became  truly 
global. 
 
Today,  these  imbalances    (or  “headwinds”)  constitute  a  serious  threat  to the  continued 
effectiveness  of  monetary  stimulus.  One  particular  source  of  concern  is  the  state  of 
household balance sheets in many countries. As a result of previous low household saving 
                                                           
30 For a critique of some of the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of such models, see Rudd  and Whelan 
(2003) 
31 On this theme, against a far wider historical and philosophical backdrop, see Talib (2007) 
32 Consider the path of the policy rate in the US in the early 1990’s, the first years of this decade, and most 
recently. Both the size of the policy rate reduction and its speed have increased through successive cycles. This 
is consistent with the instrument instability argument made above. 
33 The joint conference of the CEPR and ESI that took place in September of last year, at the BIS in Basel, was 
but one of many.  Its topic was “The evolving financial system and the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy”.  
34 It is evident from casual inspection that almost all asset prices, most commodity prices, and implicit 
volatilities derived from option prices, had an inflection point around the middle of 2003. It is perhaps more 
than correlation that global nominal policy rates hit their low point at that time, with rates of zero, one percent 
and two percent in Japan, the United States and the Euro zone respectively.  










rates, debt levels are very high. Against a backdrop of falling asset prices and tightening 
credit conditions, this will impede consumption going forward.  Moreover, the real burden of 
this debt would rise even further, should prices and wages begin to fall. Evidently, monetary 
policy in the major countries now has very little room to lower nominal policy rates further. 
This implies that, even with inflationary expectations stable at some low level, real interest 
rates (ex ante) would be positive. Moreover, it is not unlikely that declining prices might 
even be extrapolated into the future. This would imply an even higher real rate of interest 




As for the  third argument, that the depressions in the US a nd Japan were primarily the 
product of too timid monetary easing,  it cannot be denied that still  more aggressive easing 
might have  made a material difference.   However, this is a   supposition  rather than a 
statement of fact. What is a fact is that, in both cases, interest rates were eased very sharply 
at the beginning of each crisis, and in the latter case, significantly more than a Taylor rule 
would have implied.
36 A competing (or perhaps complementary ) hypothesis would be that 
the difficulties seen in  previous    downturns were related to the excesses of the earlier 
upturns.  In Japan, for example, it is a fact that investment levels collapsed after the crisis 
broke and that the corporate ratio of debt to value added fell continuously for over a 
decade
37.  Above,  four  major  sets  of  global  economic  and  financial  imbalances  were 
identified, of which only one has to do with the increased risk exposure (and inadequate 
capital) of financial institutions. Should the global economy now slow abruptly,  in spite of 
the unprecedented degree of monetary easing seen almost everywhere, this would provide 
particularly clear evidence that underlying deflationary forces have their roots  as much in 
the preceding “boom” period as in subsequent policy errors. 
The fourth set of arguments, that monetary policy can still be effective even when policy 
rates are near zero,  can be questioned (although not refuted) on various grounds. First, a 
credible commitment to keep policy rates low for an extended period to fight deflation 
assumes there are no other arguments for potentially having to raise policy rates. One such 
argument  in  the  United  States  would  be  fear  of  a  currency  crisis  arising  from  the  long 
standing  increase  in  US  external  indebtedness.  The  argument  that  changes  in  the 
composition of a central bank’s balance sheet can effectively alter risk premia would seem to 
assume a high degree of non-substitutability between assets. This view has not been at all 
fashionable in academic circles in recent years, though it might now be being reassessed in 
light of the current degree of market dysfunction. Recall as well the failure of “Operation 
Twist” and various studies into the effectiveness (or rather the ineffectiveness ) of foreign 
exchange rate intervention in large, liquid markets. Indeed, the fact that the Federal Reserve 
has  recently  felt  it  necessary  to  embark  upon  a  policy  of  quantitative  easing  is  itself 
testimony  to  the  shortcomings  of  the  policy  initiatives  taken  to  date.  Whether  this  last 
                                                           
35 On this dynamic, the classic reference is Fisher (1936) 
36 See BIS (2001) Chapter 4 
37 A still unsettled issue is whether Japan’s poor performance throughout the 1990’s was due to corporation’s 
not wishing to invest, because of earlier overinvestment, or because a weakened banking system was not 
prepared to lend them the money. Recent statements by Japanese officials seem more sympathetic to the 










recourse will work in stimulating real output growth remains to be seen, but the previous 
experience with quantitative easing in Japan cannot be considered wholly encouraging.
38  
This said, quantitative easing raises the possibility of two further channels through which 
monetary policy might regain its effectiveness. The first is a direct effect on inflationary 
expectations. The second is a direct effect on asset prices. Either could lead to a recovery of 
spending, as described below. However, the risks associated with each are also substantial . 
In effect, the cure might well prove as dangerous as the disease. 
Scepticism about the efficacy of conventional monetary policy, when policy rates are already 
at zero,  rests largely  on a combination of two beliefs. First, a positive output gap is required 
to cause inflationary expectations to move in a positive direction. And, second, when policy 
rates  are  already  zero,  it  is  believed  that  monetary  policy  cannot  produce  such  an 
outcome
39.  However, it is possible that quantitative easing could short circuit this dynamic 
by having a direct effect on inflationary expectations . A number of  academics have made 
such arguments.
40  Indeed, this view is also implicit in the credit given to central banks for 
having produced “The Great Moderation” over the two decades prior to 2007. Similarly,  we 
have decades of observations from many Latin American countries indicating the extent and 
speed with which inflationary expectations (and inflation) responded directly to perceived 
changes in the monetary regime  
These observations lead to the conclusion that quantitative easing could in theory  moderate 
or even reverse a debt/deflation dynamic. However, the associated risk would be that the 
process could easily get out of hand. Expectations driven by forward looking beliefs in the 
integrity  of  the  monetary  framework  would  seem  more  open  to  rapid  revision  than 
expectations  based  on  recent  historical  experience
41.  The fact that the Federal Reserve 
recently took steps to make its longer term inflation objectives more concrete, presu mably 
indicates both an awareness of the potential problem and a willingness to  confront it 
directly. An underlying problem, however, is the credibility of such commitments , given the 
usefulness of higher rates of inflation in eroding debt burdens that are  difficult to reduce in 
any other way. This problem can only be aggravated by the growing perception that central 
banks in many countries are increasingly acting like agents of their respective  Ministries of 
Finance.  
 One possible route to inflation rising more than desired might be a process of  self-fulfilling 
expectations, either in financial markets or  in the market for labour. Suppose that foreign 
holders of  US debt, almost wholly denominated in dollars,  began to fear an inflationary 
outcome. They would then presumably try   to protect themselves by selling their  dollar 
denominated assets, putting downward pressure on the prices of both those assets and the 
                                                           
38 While there can be little doubt that massive increases in the nominal money stock will eventually result in 
increases in nominal quantities in the real economy, how this might be split between increases in real 
economic activity and prices ( in anything short of the “long run”) is not clear. 
39 In the late 1990’s the Bank of Japan was advised by many to adopt an inflation targeting framework to resist 
deflationary tendencies. The Bank refused to do so. They  argued that they had no effective tools to influence 
aggregate demand, and therefore could not deliver on the promise of price stability.  
40 For example, see Svennson (2003). 
41 Schumpeter (1934, p4)refers to an even more sinister possibility. He notes that in 1896 in the US there was a 
significant possibility that bimetallism might replace the gold standard. The implication of this inflationary 
threat was not higher inflation, as might have been expected. “On the contrary, although underlying conditions 











42.  In short, the risk premia on dollar denominated assets would rise.  This could 
conceivably raise aggregate demand (if the effect on domestic demand of higher domestic 
rates was less than the net effect of the currency depreciation) and would also directly raise 
US inflation  through higher import costs Perhaps worse, the combination of  falling asset 
prices and a weaker dollar might well culminate in stagflation.  Similarly, domestic wages 
might also react more sharply than desired  if wage earners began to fear  an inflationary 
policy directed to reducing the real burden of debt at their expense.  
The second channel through which quantitative easing might work would be  a direct effect 
on asset prices, with higher wealth then leading to higher spending. As to a direct  and 
significant effect on asset prices, this would have to be judged  unlikely, unless inflationary 
expectations  were  also  moving  upwards  with  all  the  risks  just  described.  Against  the 
background  of  recent  asset  price  declines  from  “unsustainable”  levels,  there  can  be  no 
likelihood of previous peaks being repeated. Indeed, were this to happen it would constitute 
a repeat of the previous bubble with presumably even greater costs at some later date. At 
best, there might be a hope that asset prices have already overshot on the downside and 
that quantitative easing might provide a mechanism to reverse that overshoot. As for the 
effect of higher asset prices on spending, this is also unclear. There now seems to be growing 
agreement that, aside from asset price movements based on expectations of higher future 
productivity, higher asset prices do not in fact constitute an increase in wealth
43. They do, 
however, provide more collateral to support more borrowing which might in turn lead to 
more spending. The difficulty with this mechanism, however, is that  banks do not want to 
lend at the current juncture and potential borrowers do not wish to borrow.  
Finally, another risk must be confronted.  Should any or all of the extraordinary measures 
being taken currently to stimulate aggregate demand prove effective, then these measures 
will have to be reversed in a timely way. This leaves open the possibility of policy mistakes.  
While presumably no policymaker would be expected to desire anything other than a 
modest increase in inflation, history teaches us that control over this process is by no means 
perfect. For example, there are a number of reasons today why policymakers might have an 
exaggerated view of the level of potential going forward (and therefore the size of the 
output gap)
44. First, after a bubble period, misallocated resources must be shi fted to more 
productive  uses.  More  concretely,  the  automobile,  financial  services  and  construction 
industries in many advanced market economies all seem too large, as does the potential of 
Asia to export consumer goods. During this process of adjustment, the level of global potential 
will shift down and the structural rate of unemployment will shift up
45. Second, hysteretic  
effects , as unemployed workers lose contact with the labor market, could aggravate such 
                                                           
42 A related  problem is the state of health of the US financial system. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) document 
the ease with which banking crises can turn into exchange rate crises with significant macroeconomic costs. 
43 In particular, consider the case of rising house prices. An increase in wealth allows an increase in living 
standards. Evidently, living standards do not rise with house prices since the rising asset value is offset by the 
higher implicit rent required to live in the  house. For a more formal analysis of this matter, see White (2007) 
and Muelbauer(2007) 
44 Many central banks estimate potential using statistical “filters” based on past output levels. Evidently, if 
those previous output levels were not sustainable, such estimates of potential will be biased upwards.  
45 This point was made more broadly and much earlier by Schumpeter (1934) among others. He states (p16) 
“The chief difficulty lies in the fact that depressions are not simply evils, which we might try to suppress but-
perhaps undesirable- forms of something which has to be done, namely, adjustment to previous economic 
change. Most of what would be effective in remedying a depression would be equally effective in preventing 










developments,  particularly  in  countries  with  badly  functioning  labour  markets.    A  third  
possible source of concern might be some rethinking (say, given the threat of protectionism) 
of  the  integrated  global  supply  network  that  has  built  up  over  many  years.  There  are 
grounds for believing that globalization has made a material contribution to lower inflation 
in recent years, and that a reversal of such trends might have the opposite effect
46. Fourth,  
economic  downturns commonly result in reductions in capital formation and in total factor 
productivity. Fifth, and finally, new legislation together with reregulation and nationalisation 
all have the effect of reducing potential . T hese uncertainties must be added to those that, 
even in the past, led to potential “gaps” being very difficult to estimate in real time.  
Another concern, given the extent to which central banks have massively increased the size 
of their balance sheets, is whether they will have the technical skills to reverse the expansion 
as quickly as they might like. Recall, that all of this is effectively unchartered territory. In 
particular, the price at which central banks might be able to sell the kinds of assets they have 
recently begun to purchase remains to be determined. This implies that withdrawing bank 
reserves could have disruptive effects in some financial markets at least. Thus, a delicate 
balancing act is required.  As the real economy improves, tightening must be “measured” 
enough not to destabilize still fragile confidence and financial markets, but also fast enough 
not to allow inflationary expectations to rise too much. This will be particularly difficult if the 
source of demand expansion was itself a rise in inflationary expectations associated with 
quantitative easing.  And to all this must be added the risk  of political pressure being applied 
by  governments  worried  about  the  cost  of  debt  service  on  rapidly  rising  debts.  The 
experience of the United States and Japan in recent years indicates that the exit problem is 
not inconsequential
47. 
By way of summary, Keynes worried that the use of monetary policy to reverse downturns 
would eventually be like “pushing on a string”. For this reason, he advocated the use of fiscal 
stimulus in severely depressed economic conditions.
48 Hayek was similarly skeptical about 
the role of monetary policy. He noted that, if excessive money and credit was the source of 
the economic problem, it was not self evident that still more money and credit was part of 
the solution.
49 Indeed, pre-War business cycle theorists worried that the end game of this 
monetary and credit expansion might be hyperinflation, as occurred in central Europe in the 
early 1920’s. While most central banks today seem firmly committed to the pursuit of price 
                                                           
46 See White (2008a) 
47 Consider the process of “measured” tightening which took place in the United States from 2005 to 2007. A 
principal motivation for the Fed giving advanced warning of its intentions was to allow those exposed to such 
tightening to cover their positions. In contrast, it could be contended that this policy might have had the 
opposite effect of that intended. The highly predictable nature of forthcoming policy  moves significantly 
reduced the risks of position taking, and this could have further encouraged the buildup of leverage. Indeed, if 
the size of the “carry” was constantly declining, an increase in leverage would have been essential to keep up 
the rate of return on capital. In sum, a shorter term problem might have been avoided, but again at the 
expense of aggravating a longer term one. Consider also the case of Japan, where high levels of short term 
Government debt have been said to have led to political pressure to keep policy rates down to ease debt 
servicing requirements. 
48 Of course recommending the use of fiscal stimulus in such extreme conditions does not necessarily imply a 
similar recommendation in the face of minor downturns, much less “preemptive” policies. 
49 In his later years, however, Hayek admitted that he had been wrong in the 1930’s in resisting the use of 
monetary and fiscal stimulus to offset the effects of a “secondary depression” See Haberler (1986). By this, 
Hayek  seemed to have meant a downward deflationary spiral sparked by, but independent of, the imbalances 










stability , the technical questions just referred to could still raise doubts as to its attainability. 
Both  prospective  inflation  and  deflation  remain  serious  risks.    All  these  considerations 
strengthen the arguments for not getting into such a dangerous situation in the first place. 
Further support for this proposition is provided by recognizing other longer term problems 
associated  with  the  maintenance  of  very  expansionary  monetary  policies  in  such  a 
situation
50. These problems were emphasized by many pre -war theorists
51, but can also be 
illustrated using more recent examples.
52 
C.    Can other policies be used to “clean up” regardless? 
Considering the possibility that stimulative monetary policy might either not work effectively 
in the downturn, or might expose the economy to other risks over a longer horizon, raises 
the issue of other remedies. Should these also be deemed unreliable in restoring growth, or 
also have undesirable longer term side effects, then the dangers associated with not leaning 
against the upswing of the credit cycle become still more evident. 
Fiscal stimulus is the obvious way to increase demand. However, the level of government 
debt  in  many  jurisdictions  is  already  so  high  as  to  invoke  concerns  about  “Ricardian 
Equivelance”. That is, seeing through the “veil” of government, taxpayers might tighten their 
belts as governments loosen theirs. In this regard, the muted response of the US economy to 
the fiscal package of 2007 was particularly disappointing. Moreover, in some cases, further 
fiscal stimulus might even lead risk premia and interest rates to rise, which would further 
mute the overall stimulus provided to spending
53. If such fears were also to interact with 
concerns about monetary financing, exchange rate depreciation and eventual inflation, as 
discussed above in the case of the United States, the negative feedb ack would presumably 
be even greater. In Europe, the fact that sovereign spreads have already begun to move up 
in countries with high debt levels (particularly in Central and Eastern Europe) is of increasing 
concern. So too has been the recent increase in CDS spreads for sovereign debts issued by a 
number of countries, and the growing threat of rating downgrades.   In sum, even fiscal 
stimulus might  have its limitations and longer term dangers.  
Of course, the ultimate remedy for a problem of over indebtedness is to recognize the facts, 
and to write off in an orderly way those debts that cannot  be serviced. However, here too 
there are grounds for concern.  Unlike previous sovereign debt crises, when all the principals 
involved could be assembled in one room, there are now literally millions of households 
whose debts will not be serviced under the initially agreed conditions. Moreover, many of 
                                                           
50 See White (2006) for a fuller description of all these problems. 
51 The classic reference providing an overview of such theories is Haberler (1939). 
52 First, as was seen in Japan, low rates can actually encourage forbearance and impede the balance sheet 
restructuring and/or bankruptcies necessary to reduce excess capacity.  Second, this environment can 
encourage mergers and acquisitions having little long term merit. Third, as seen in Japan in the early 1990’s and 
many countries more recently, very low rates sustained for long periods can impede the functioning of the 
interbank market leaving the central bank as the market maker of last resort. 
53 At the time of the Swedish banking crisis and associated deep (if short) recession, the authorities felt it would 
be  imprudent to use discretionary fiscal stimulus to offset the downturn. This was particularly so since the 
Swedish krona had been under much pressure and the current account deficit was still large. See Heikenstein 
(1998). In the current downturn, the Irish government has also chosen to use tighter discretionary fiscal policy 
to offset a massive deterioration in the fiscal position arising from automatic stabilizers and a sharply 
weakening economy. Many other countries have stated the view that high initial debt levels imply they can do 










these debts are encumbered by second mortgages
54, or are parts of structured products 
implying that property and forecl osure rights are less clear
55. These complications will 
impede any process of negotiating debt reduction, implying that the ultimate losses  could  
be much larger than otherwise.
56 The new reality of credit transfer instruments is a further 
complication, since it implies that the interests of creditors are no longer aligned. Some 
creditors now profit more from a default than a negotiated settlement.  
Compared to these problems, the difficulties facing policymakers in  restoring the normal 
functioning of the financial system might actually seem less daunting. Yet, it is obvious from 
recent developments, especially but not exclusively in the United States, that even this task 
can be  highly complicated. Alternative approaches (price support, recapitalization, “bad” 
banks and temporary nationalization) all have both advantages and disadvantages that must 
be  assessed  and  weighed.  The  complications  posed  by  large,  internationally  active  and 
complex international banks are also substantial. Moreover, however it is done, support for 
the financial system, will have costs for taxpayers (or at least potential exposures) which 
could also spark the fiscal concerns just noted above.  
Finally, and for the sake of completeness, two other sets of policies have been suggested as 
potentially useful in the face of major economic downturns. On closer examination, both 
have  serious  drawbacks.  The  first  is,  in  principle,  extremely  sensible  as  a  medium  term 
proposition. Policies that encourage declining industries to adjust quickly should be pursued 
(including debt write downs and bankruptcies) since they serve to ensure that factors of 
production  are  available  to  support  emerging  industries
57.Unfortunately,  in practice,  the 
short term effects of such policies would be to make the downturn  more severe and, thus, 
they have never had much (if any) political support. Indeed, as has been seen recently with 
respect to the global car industry , great efforts are being made  by the official sector  to 
prevent its inevitable downsizing from happening. The second set of policies has to do with 
wages. It was suggested by the Hoover administration , in the United States in the early 
1930’s, that industrial wage levels be maintained since wage income would contribute to 
consumption and aggregate demand. Unfortunately, the implication was lower profits and a 
lower demand for labor. While this left the overall effect on the wage bill and consumption 
indeterminate, the lower profits did imply lower investment.
58 In sum, there are no magic 
bullets in these policy suggestions either.  
                                                           
54 Ashcroft and Schuerman (2008) estimate that by 2006 around 40 percent of AltA and 25 percent of subprime 
mortgages were encumbered by a “silent second” mortgage. The “silent” refers to their contention that, in 
most cases, this fact was hidden from the bank that subsequently bought the mortgages to incorporate them 
into structured products.  
55 Indeed, many structured products contain clauses expressly ruling out changes in the original debt 
instruments.  
56 A further very practical complication is that renegotiating contracts to mutual advantage takes time. The 
current institutional infrastructure in the United States, and perhaps elsewhere, is simply inadequate to the 
task. Consider that there were 3 million foreclosure filings in the US in 2008, and that most observers think the 
problem is likely to get worse going forward.   
57 Schumpeter (1934) and others in the Austrian school emphasized the crucial importance of such 
adjustments. A  number of private sector commentators have recently made similar points, noting that 
expansionary policies are likely to impede necessary longer term adjustments in the auto, real estate and  
financial services industries. In all these sectors, there is significant global overcapacity. See the article on 
“zombie companies” In Business Week, 15 January, 2009, as well as  Tett (2009) for a set of broader concerns 
about how needed corporate restructuring is currently being impeded. 










D.     Conclusion: the need for a new macrofinancial stability framework  
The  current  global  economic  and  financial  circumstances  are  already  extremely  difficult.  
Moreover, a variety of other risks now seem all too plausible; financial disruptions, currency 
crises and uncertain price developments  among them.  This raises the question of steps that 
might  be  taken  to  reduce  the  likelihood  of  similar  risks  arising  in  the  future;  i.e.  crisis 
prevention.  Such steps would seem desirable in themselves. Moreover, they would seem all 
the more desirable today given the need to take unprecedented measures to manage the 
current crisis. Many of these measures will clearly have undesirable side effects over the 
medium  term,  consistent  with  the  analysis  above.
59  A  credible  commitment  to  an 
institutional framework to ensure that similar problems would not arise in the future might 
then go some way to offset these undesirable side effects. 
  
Not surprisingly in current circumstances, the possibility that  liberalized financial systems 
might  be  inherently  “procyclical”  is  already  receiving  increasing  attention.  Similarly,  the 
possibility  that  accumulated  imbalances  might  significantly  reduce  the  effectiveness  of 
stimulative monetary policy is being increasingly accepted. In particular, it cannot be denied 
that the period of financial market turmoil, which began almost two years  ago, has been 
met with an extraordinary and creative response on the part of central banks. Nevertheless, 
the financial turmoil has continued unabated and the real side of the global economy looks 
increasingly vulnerable.  
Moreover, looking forward, there are grounds for belief that the problem of procyclicality 
could  well  get  worse.  Three  major  structural  shifts  within  the  financial  sector  have 
encouraged procylicality; securitization, globalization and consolidation.  After  some pause 
associated with the current crisis, these secular trends seem likely to resume since they have 
been driven in large part by improving technology, which will not be easy to roll back by 
government decree. In addition, there are grounds for belief that fair value accounting, in 
spite of the  unwanted  contribution  it  makes to  the  procyclicality  of  the  system,  will be 
increasingly adopted.  Whatever its faults, it seems better than the available alternative 
accounting benchmarks. Finally, the great advantage of Basel II is that it allows relative risk 
weights to change to reflect changes in underlying fundamentals. But, at the same time, it 
also allows the absolute weights to change over time. Evidently, in and of itself, this too 
could  exacerbate  procyclicality.  In  sum,  there  are  numerous  grounds  for  belief  that  the 
problem of procyclicality, already severe, will worsen going forward. 
The fundamental conclusion to be drawn from balancing all the arguments above is that we 
need a new macrofinancial framework to resist procyclicality
60. This can be done in a market 
friendly way. The intention must be to preserve the efficiencies generated by new financial 
developments, while  at the same time mitigating  inherent threats to safety and stability. 
Focusing  on  a  the  development  of  a  new  framework  to  reduce  procyclic ality,  the 
fundamental problem,  could also mitigate the tendency for politicians to rely on  heavy 
handed and  punitive regulation designed  primarily to stop the recurrence of yesterday’s 
                                                           
59  For example; consider all the longer term problems of monetary easing noted above. Note that  major 
increases in the ratio of government debt to GDP reduce the policy room for maneouvre going forward. Private 
sector debt reduction invites moral hazard, and further consolidation in the banking sector has the unwanted 
implication that still more banks become  “too big to fail” or even “too big to save” 
60 This suggestion is presented in more detail in White (2005) and in various BIS Annual Reports. See also Borio 










problems. While some such changes are surely needed
61, care must be taken to address 
underlying causes of problems as well as their symptoms.  
The central characteristics of such a system would be three in number. The first  one would 
be an increased emphasis on systemic exposures. In particular, attention would be focused 
on the dangers associated with many different economic agents (households, corporations 
and financial institutions) having similar exposures to possible common shocks, and also the 
possibility of common responses. It is the shared exposures that  contribute the most to 
systemic problems within the financial sector and to the joint vulnerability of the real and 
financial sectors.  
Given that this is essentially a macroeconomic problem, rather than one confined to the 
financial system, it might also be suggested that central banks (with their “top down” view of 
things)  should  be  given  ultimate  responsibility  for  resisting  procyclicality  and  systemic 
distress
62. Such a mandate for the central bank would in fact be consistent with the generally 
accepted view that price stability should be its principal objective. This consistency becomes 
obvious if one accepts the fact that price stability can be as easily threatened by deflation as 
inflation,  if  a  boom -bust  cycle  is  allowed  to  become  sufficiently  severe.  Indeed,  a 
deflationary spiral might in the end prove significantly more dangerous than an inflationary 
one since, as suggested above, monetary instruments can lose their potency in the face of 
high debt levels and the zero interest rate bound.  
If central banks are to be given responsibility for “macroprudential” or systemic  issues, what 
should be the role of  traditional regulators?  Evidently, there would still be need for a 
“microprudential”  form  of  regulation  that  would  focus  on  the  safety  and  soundness  of 
individual instituitions, particularly those that are large and complex. While this function 
could also reside in the central bank, it might be better to leave this in a separate institution 
also  charged  with  ensuring  appropriate  market  conduct  and  consumer  protection.  This 
“Twin  Peaks”  model  (now  in  place  in  Australia  and  being  suggested  elsewhere)  has  the 
particular advantage of clarity about institutional objectives, a characteristic which also helps 
to ensure accountability of the agencies responsible. 
A second characteristic of such a framework is that it would be much more symmetric. That 
is, the instruments used to resist procyclicality would attempt to lean against the upturn of 
the credit cycle rather than relying on cleaning up after the bubble had burst.  In effect, 
“preemptive tightening” would replace “preemptive easing”, for all of the reasons suggested 
above.  This  argument  having  been  accepted  at  the  level  of  principle,  it  must  also  be 
accepted  that  the  practical  implementation  of  such  a  policy  would  not  be  without 
difficulties.  
As suggested above, conventional models (especially those based on recent data) are not 
likely to be very helpful in identifying problems which accumulate slowly during upturns and 
then suddenly materialize. That is the principal reason why most forecasters missed the 
current downturn. In contrast, indicators of growing “imbalances” in the economy  do seem 
to  have  useful  predictive  powers
63. Unusually rapid credit and monetary growth rates, 
                                                           
61 See the report of the Financial Stability Forum (2008) to the G-8 for a long list of useful suggestions. 
62 This is consistent with the thrust of the proposals made recently by the de Larosière group and by Lord 
Turner, for the Euro area and the UK respectively.  










unusually low interest rates, unusually high asset prices, unusual spending patterns (say very 
low household saving or unusually high investment levels) all ought to attract the attention 
of  those  charged  with  resisting  procyclicality.  Unusually  high  external  trade  positions 
(whether deficits or surpluses) are another indicator that unsustainable exposures are being 
built up
64.  
How might these indicators influence the setting of policy instruments? Here, much more 
work  remains  to  be  done ,  particularly  with  the  calibration  of  monetary  instruments. 
Nevertheless, all the arguments presented above suggest that interest rates in the expansion 
phase of  the credit cycle  would  have to be tighter than inflation control alone would 
warrant. Absent higher interest rates, the underlying problem of excessive credit expansion 
will be extremely difficult to address.  This will be particularly the case if current t rends to 
disintermediated finance continue, implying that currently regulated institutions account for 
a steadily shrinking proportion of total credit growth. Evidently, this policy would then have 
to be explained to the public , currently conditioned to believe that meeting price stability 
objectives is sufficient to achieve good macroeconomic performance.  
Regulatory policies would have a similar bias, with measures being taken to ensure that risk 
spreads (for expected losses), provisioning (for changes in  expected losses) and capital (for 
unexpected losses) were built up in good times and run down in the bad
65. Similarly, these 
regulatory actions would also have to be explained, particularly to the accounting profession 
and the fiscal authorities. Both groups, for understandable microeconomic reasons, have in 
many cases strongly opposed such policies  in the past. Note as well that the use of  such 
regulatory actions would likely be insufficient to deal with the underlying problem of credit 
growth and the wide range of imbalances to which it might lead.  As recently indicated by 
developments  in  Spain,  contracyclical  measures  such  as  “dynamic  provisioning”  allowed 
Spanish banks to be better prepared for the downturn (thus moderating the need to tighten 
credit conditions more recently). However, they did not prove very helpful in moderating the 
preceding upturn. Again, one is led to the conclusion that both regulatory and monetary 
instruments will have to be mobilized to deal effectively with the procyclicality problem. 
Regulatory instruments do have one natural attribute. In the face of the many impediments 
to the discretionary use of both regulatory and monetary instruments
66,it is not difficult to 
envisage the introduction of regulatory rules that would avoid many  of these problems. 
Dynamic  provisioning  as  introduced  by  the  Bank  of  Spain ,  is  one  possibility.   Another 
possibility would be to  continue to  calculate capital requirements as currently proposed 
under Pillar 1 of Basel II. This relates capital requirements  to the perceived risk of the 
portfolio of individual institutions. This figure might then be grossed up (using the  existing 
authority of Pillar 2) to reflect system wide imbalances indicating the growing risk of 
systemic disturbances. Such an approach woul d act to offset the inherent procyclicality of 
Basel II, while building on its strengths at the same time.  
The  issue  of  how  to  deal  with  currently  unregulated  institutions  also  needs  further 
reflection, since there can be no doubt that tighter requirement s on regulated players will 
                                                           
64 These might be defined as “macrosystemic indicators” of potential systemic stress. In addition, there might 
well be other “microsystemic indicators” (for example, measures of leverage or concentration in financial 
markets) that might also provide useful warning signals of accumulating stress. See Borio and Dehmann (2008) 
65 This suggestion is consistent with the thrust of the argument in Brunnermeir et al (2009) 










encourage migration elsewhere. The creation of SIV’s and conduits to escape the capital 
requirements of Basel I attest to this. Presumably, the scope of regulation will have to be 
extended, at least to systemically important players, though in a globalized world this too 
has pitfalls. For this reason too, automatic (rule based) regulatory measures might still prove 
insufficient  to  deal  with  the  underlying  problem  of  procyclicality.  In  this  case,  both 
regulatory and monetary policies might also have to be tightened in a discretionary way at a 
second stage.  
A third characteristic of such a macrofinancial stability framework is that the authorities 
involved would have to be much more mutually supportive than they appear to be at the 
moment. This implies more cooperation, both nationally and internationally. With respect to 
national authorities, silo mentalities currently prevail in many countries. With respect to 
international cooperation, national authorities remain almost wholly driven by questions of 
national interest. Hopefully, this might be changed. 
At the national level, assuming adoption of the Two Peaks model which allocates ultimate 
responsibility for different objectives to different agencies, central bankers and regulators 
should work much more closely together. This would involve ongoing discussion about both 
the indicators of growing imbalances and exposures and the appropriate policy responses. 
Central  bankers  (mostly  economists)  and  regulators  (often  from  a  legal  or  accounting 
background) need to recognize that they have a great deal to learn from each other. Their 
respective “top down” and “bottom up” approaches also complement each other. Treasuries 
should actively encourage such cooperation since, should an unresisted boom turn to bust, it 
is the taxpayers who ultimately have to pay for any resulting bailouts.  
As for mutual support at the international level, countries wishing to counter procyclical 
tendencies at home must pay more attention to the international dimension. Three points 
seem particularly important.  
First, the oversight of internationally active financial institutions must have an international 
dimension. In many cases, foreign banks are so important that their failure could threaten 
macroeconomic stability in the host country (think of Central and Eastern Europe).  At the 
same time, the international exposure of some banks is so large that losses elsewhere could 
threaten the health of the home country (think of Iceland). Indeed, it is not inconceivable 
that the home country would not have the fiscal means to save a bank that might be thought 
in principle “too big to fail”. Everyone would then pay a price for the disorderly failure of a 
bank that proved “too big to save”.  
Second,  more  recognition  must  be  given  to  the  fact  that  international  economic  and 
financial linkages have been steadily growing. One implication of this greater integration is 
that domestic indicators of procyclical behavior  will under  estimate the threat posed to 
stability (and to inflation as well) to the extent that other countries are subject to similar 
pressures.  A second implication, now all to evident,  is that a “bust” in an important debtor 
country  (say  the  US)  can  have  significant  effects  on  output  in  creditor    countries  (say 
Germany,  Japan  and  China)  that do  not  in  fact  seem  to  share  the  domestic  imbalances 
generated by    procyclical  tendencies.  From  a policy  perspective,  this greater  integration 
implies  that  everyone  has  a  legitimate  interest  in  encouraging  debtor  countries  with 










have a responsibility to change their own policies to the extent that they are encouraging 
excesses elsewhere by providing the financing to sustain them.  
Third, and closely related, much more attention needs to be paid to the role of exchange 
rates in fostering procyclical behavior. The efforts of many countries in emerging market 
countries to prevent their currencies from rising against the US dollar, both through easy 
monetary policies and explicit intervention, effectively imported US “imbalances“ into their 
own countries. Moreover, since the US dollar has been trending down over this last decade, 
this policy served to increase their domestic inflationary pressures as well. Moreover, these 
policies not only had undesirable domestic effects but undesirable international implications 
as well. First, by preventing the US dollar from falling and by lowering US long term rates in 
the process of reserve accumulation, both the elasticity and absorption channels of trade 
adjustment were impeded. As a result, global trade imbalances became ever bigger and 
more  dangerous.  Second,  with  many  currencies  prevented  from  moving  against  the  US 
dollar,  an    unwarranted  degree  of    upward  pressure  was  diverted  to  freely  floating 
currencies like the euro
67 For all of these reasons, it is now in  the interests of all countries to 








                                                           
67 Against this backdrop of very easy global liquidity conditions, another problem also emerged. Smaller 
countries that wished  to tighten their domestic monetary policy found such efforts undermined by 
international capital flows which pushed down long rates and pushed up asset prices. In principle this should 
not happen if the theory of Uncovered Interest Rate Parity(UIP) prevails. In practice, UIP seems to prevail only 
over long horizons implying that unhelpful capital flows can continue for long periods. This was clearly a 
problem for New Zealand and for the United Kingdom as their central banks sought to tighten policy in the 
years preceding the crisis of August 2007. Indeed, as the US dollar continued to weaken, even as domestic 
policy rates rose from 2005 onwards, capital inflows provided a significant degree of offset to the general 
thrust of US policy. This raises the broader issue of whether even the United States must now be treated as a 
Small Open Economy. 
68 This gives some urgency for calls to reform the Fund itself (the question of “chairs and shares”). If large, 
emerging market countries shared a sense of “ownership”, the Fund might find it easier to produce a more 
universal floating exchange rate system, at least among the bigger currency blocks.  Moreover, a more effective 
Fund might also find it easier to convince the large creditor nations (China, Germany and Japan in particular) 
that in a closed global economy everyone must contribute to measures to reduce global trade imbalances. 
Indeed, the need for creditors to adjust takes on added importance when the overall environment is 
deflationary rather than inflationary. This is, of course, precisely the set of circumstances we face today. 
Against this background of external imbalances, the fact that the United  States has introduced by far the 
largest set of domestic stimulus measures looks positively anomalous.   
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